Harvard Initiative for Peace and Justice Weblog

Bush's Appeasement Speech in Israel & Recent History with Iran

On Thursday President Bush gave a speech to Knesset (Israeli parliament) where he stated:

Some seem to believe that we should negotiate with the terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along. We have heard this foolish delusion before. As Nazi tanks crossed into Poland in 1939, an American senator declared: "Lord, if I could only have talked to Hitler, all this might have been avoided." We have an obligation to call this what it is -- the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history. (Applause.)

Some people suggest if the United States would just break ties with Israel, all our problems in the Middle East would go away. This is a tired argument that buys into the propaganda of the enemies of peace, and America utterly rejects it. Israel's population may be just over 7 million. But when you confront terror and evil, you are 307 million strong, because the United States of America stands with you. (Applause.)

There are almost always substantial things to comment on and criticize in Bush's remarks. This blog could be entirely occupied with that task. There are three things in these comments worth discussing however, beyond what is being said in the mainstream.

The first is that perhaps Bush and his speechwriters didn't realize that he was including 64% of the population of Israel in his condemnation of "the false comfort of appeasement". That is the percentage that a recent (Israel's leading paper) Haaretz poll found favored direct negotiations with Hamas.

The second is what is implicit in Bush's statement: "as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along." This presupposes that the proper goal of negotiations is to get them to admit that the US and its allies we were 100% right, blameless, and unless they give up all their claims and demands the negotiations would be pointless. This is an incredible straw man, and clearly no serious proponent of negotiations goes into them with these assumptions. Bush thinks everyone shares his (stated, although not consistently adhered to) version of negotiation which is roughly "accept all our terms, then maybe we'll meet for a photo op."

For those interested in actual negotiations, which would include compromises from both sides, the more serious version of Bush's argument would be that negotiations will not yield a beneficial outcome because radicals are not willing to cede meaningful ground. A review of recent history in the case of Iran is useful here. There is a good pbs frontline documentary Showdown with Iran which catalogs it. In 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq, the Iranian reformist administration of President Mohammed Khatami reached out to the United States for a grand bargain. The following is from the transcript:

NARRATOR: A few weeks after the invasion, a strange document arrived in Washington. It laid out the terms for a "grand bargain" - in essence, a peace treaty between Iran and the United States. But it came as a fax from the Swiss ambassador in Teheran, on plain paper.
Prof. VALI NASR, Tufts University: There are many reasons why it came through the channels that it did. We forget that this offer came after Iran made its boldest cooperation with the United States over Afghanistan, only to be put on the "axis of evil" list afterwards.
NARRATOR: Iran's reformists were again trying to reach out to Washington, as they had after 9/11.
Prof. VALI NASR: So as the Khatami government, the reformist government, is making one last effort to make a pitch to the U.S. it is running a risk. And I assume that their hope was that the U.S. would test the proposal by coming back, which then would have made a signal to the Iranian leadership that the U.S. was interested.
NARRATOR: The reformists put everything on the table: Iran's support for terrorism, its nuclear program, even its hostility towards Israel. In exchange, they asked Washington for security guarantees, an end to sanctions, and a promise never to push for regime change.

The PBS site has a web page devoted to this fax. You can also see a copy of the fax which is still hosted by the New York Times. The Middle East director of the National Security Council Flynt Leverett considered this be a serious proposal and thought it should be pursued. The Bush administration ignored the Fax as the documentary goes on to describe, marginalizing the reformists and continuing its threats giving new ammunition to the rise of Ahmadinejad:

NARRATOR: The State Department thought the reformists were politically weak and promising more than they could deliver. The White House, newly victorious in Iraq, saw no need to negotiate with Iran. The "grand bargain" fax never received a reply.
In Teheran, sources confirmed that the Supreme Leader had, in fact, given the proposal his tacit blessing. A senior diplomat connected to his family even helped draft it. But today, the leader's confidant denies everything.
HOSSEIN SHARIATMADARI, Editor, Kayhan Newspaper: [through interpreter] I'm sure the Supreme Leader had nothing to do with it. Whoever wrote that letter was in no position to do so.
NARRATOR: Iran's reformists were humiliated, their days in power numbered. And they don't talk about the "grand bargain" anymore.
MOHAMMAD ALI ABTAHI, Former Vice President: [through interpreter] What is certain is that it didn't get anywhere and that case is now closed.
NARRATOR: The hardliners now had the upper hand. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, concluded the reform era was dead and blessed a new president.
Prof. VALI NASR: It was very clear that the reformists were not going to deliver Washington. Their cooperation in Afghanistan failed. Their offer of a peace treaty in 2003 was rejected. And the assumption was that the hardliners would do a better job. And that, many argue, is why the Supreme Leader threw his support to Ahmadinejad.

Reading the points on the fax is heartbreaking, in that they were never pursued. When Senator Obama frequently mentions a grand bargain with Iran, it is likely that it is this exchange that he is referencing.

The episode with the Iranian reformists in 2003 is highly relevant to the lesson Bush is trying to teach. He warns that appeasing to radicals leads to increasing their boldness. What he should have learned is that marginalizing the more moderate forces willing to negotiate means helping to bring the radicals to power in the first place.

The third point is another straw man that Bush decides to erect. "Some people suggest if the United States would just break ties with Israel, all our problems in the Middle East would go away." The determining factor for US involvement in the middle east is energy, oil and gas reserves. Israel is one factor in Middle East, it is unclear who makes the argument that it is the only one.

Posted May 16, 2008 | Comments? (0)

Leave a comment